Evaluating the impact of PSC inspectors’ professional profile: a case study of the Spanish Maritime Administration by unknown
ARTICLE
Evaluating the impact of PSC inspectors’ professional
profile: a case study of the Spanish
Maritime Administration
Francisco J. Ravira1 & Francisco Piniella2
Received: 12 April 2015 /Accepted: 18 December 2015 /Published online: 7 January 2016
# World Maritime University 2016
Abstract Full-scale globalisation of trade has been accompanied by a progressive
liberalisation of maritime transport. The proliferation of open registries has created a
situation in which Port State Control (PSC) has become much more effective than the
feeble or non-existent control exercised by those States. This study has been conducted
on the influence of the professional profile of inspectors on inspection results. The
objective of our paper was to evaluate the impact of PSC inspectors’ professional
profile by conducting a case study of the Spanish Maritime Administration. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the correlation between deficiencies detected and
professional profiles.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Characteristics of the regional agreements on Port State Control
For more than 50 years, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has carried out
valuable work and invested a great deal of effort in implementing rules and regulations
covering maritime transportation to ensure compliance with vital standards of shipping
safety and marine environmental protection. The SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions
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have been adopted in respect of 90 % of the international fleet (Veiga 2002). Never-
theless, maritime regulatory regime fails to effectively address human factors and safety
management challenges, as stated by Batalden and Sydnes (2013) or Kuronen and
Tapaninen (2010), these being pretty much the same challenges as identified a century
ago (Schröder-Hinrichs et al. 2012).
The Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Port State Control (PSC)
was adopted in response to the Amoco Cadiz disaster off the French coast in 1978.
Promoted by the IMO, in recent decades, eight more agreements have been signed
on PSC procedures, all of them regional in character (Psaraftis 2002). The purpose
of this harmonised inspection system is to prevent substandard ships that present
high risk from sailing to European and Canadian North Atlantic ports and
anchorages.
The purpose of PSC is to inspect foreign vessels in national ports in order to ensure
that the ship’s conditions, equipment and crew comply with the requirements laid down
in international conventions. The Paris MoU established two types of inspection. The
first applies to all foreign vessels in member states’ ports and consists of two categories:
an initial inspection and a more detailed inspection. The second applies exclusively to
ships considered to present a special risk and consists of only one category: an
expanded inspection.
Annex XI of Directive 2009/16/EC, amended by Directive 2013/38/EU, on Port
State Control, establishes the professional profile of inspectors and the qualification
criteria. Basically, inspectors must have appropriate theoretical knowledge and practical
experience of ships and their operation and be competent in the enforcement of
conventions and the relevant PSC procedures. The requirements of becoming an
inspector vary by the MoUs and across the different countries of the regime. The
reality is that PSC officers can be naval architects, merchant marine captains, chief
engineers, even radio officers, with sea-going experience. We hypothesised that this
spectrum can generate different approaches to carry out inspections on ships. The
objective of the present study was to assess the impact of PSC inspectors’ professional
profile on inspection results by conducting a case study of the Spanish Maritime
Administration.
1.2 Literature review
The literature on PSC inspections is extensive, particularly as regards two aspects: the
implications for Maritime Law and the policies for pollution prevention and reducing
ship safety deficiencies.
Some publications, such as that by Özçayir (2004) (updated in subsequent editions),
have provided a detailed analysis of the legal consequences of implementing the
various PSC regimes. Others, such as those by Alcázar and Piniella (2001) and Kidman
(2003), are more technical than legal in nature and much more practical, describing ship
inspections and how these should be carried out. A later article by Aguilar (2008)
discussed the regime of sanctions in relation to the early evolution of the PSC regime.
Chatzirigopoulou (2010) has written a more general study, although this is limited to
updating the legal bases of the PSC system. Since 1995, the IMO (2001) has also issued
a periodically updated manual as part of a PSC model course, which has been
complemented with another on procedures (IMO 2012).
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Recent years have witnessed further important contributions on different aspects of
the PSC system. For example, Knapp (2004) and Knapp and Franses (2007a, b; 2008)
have pioneered the application of econometrics to more accurately quantify PSC
effectiveness worldwide, using binary logistic regression to identify differences be-
tween several PSC regimes. In 2007, these same researchers concluded that it was
necessary to revise the frequency of inspections according to the ship risk profile, and
their recommendation was subsequently implemented by the Paris MoU with the new
inspection regime (NIR), which took effect from the year 2011 (Knapp and Van de
Velden 2009; Knapp and Bijwaard 2009; Knapp and Franses 2010).
In a study on the role of inspectors, Knapp and Bijwaard (2009) recommended
standardising inspection procedures, providing PSC officers with training and integrating
the databases of various regimes, in particular, with a view to developing the Global
Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS). Meanwhile, Cariou and Wolf (2011) used
data from the Swedish Maritime Administration (1996–2001) to determine how ship
characteristics influence the interval between two consecutive PSC inspections and the
number of deficiencies detected during such inspections. They also investigated whether a
ship that has undergone PSC inspection at a given time subsequently presents a reduction
in the total number of deficiencies detected in the next inspection. They found that a ship’s
age, type and flag of registry were significant predictors (Cariou and Wolf 2015).
Li and Zheng (2008) studied the effectiveness of PSC and the methods adopted in
regional PSC agreements for selecting ships for inspection; their study confirmed that
the enforcement of PSC is effective in improving ship safety levels in maritime
transport. More recent and novel studies include those by Bang (2012) and Li et al.
(2014), who explored the dependencies between PSC inspections and a ship’s involve-
ment in accidents and incidents using Bayesian networks based on inspection, accident
and incident data, with two alternative algorithms.
Other important developments in this field in 2014 have included the work of the
Sub-committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (IMO 2014) and documents
issued by the Paris MoU Secretariat (Paris MoU 2008 to 2013).
AlthoughWu et al. (2014) have studied specific aspects of inspection (such as evaluating
the effectiveness of emergency fire drills or PSC inspections on board), only Knapp and
Franses (2007b) have conducted a general analysis about the influence of the professional
profile of inspectors and the results of inspections. They concluded that there are differences
in the average probabilities of detention based on inspector’s background, but it was
necessary, a further insight in order to make a final conclusion on the subject in question.
1.3 The new inspection regime
The Paris MoU was also the first in establishing a method for selecting the vessels to be
inspected. The original method of selection started from the information already
available on the vessel; this makes clear the importance of all the agreements having
their own system for transmitting vessel data throughout their network. In the case of
the Paris MoU, there were two initial procedural criteria for the selection of vessels for
inspection: first that the vessel was already listed in the category ‘Vessel for priority
inspection’ and second that it had a high ‘General selection factor’.
Since the entry into force of the NIR at the beginning of 2011, each ship in the
information system is assigned a ship risk profile, which determines its priority for
Evaluation of PSC inspectors’ professional profile 223
possible inspection, the maximum interval between inspections and the scope of the
inspection. All ships in the information system are categorised either as high, standard
or low risk (HR, SR or LR) based on generic and historical parameters. The ship’s risk
profile is recalculated daily taking into account changes in the more dynamic param-
eters such as age, the 36 months history and company performance. Recalculation also
occurs after every inspection and when the applicable performance tables for Flags and
Recognized Organizations (RO) are changed.
Based on a ship’s risk profile, the inspection and selection scheme determine the scope,
frequency and priority of inspections (Payoyo 1994; Bang 2012; Piniella et al. 2000).
2 The role of the PSC officers
2.1 Minimum criteria for inspector
Inspectors must, as a minimum, have the following:
(a) Appropriate qualifications from a marine or nautical institution and relevant sea-
going experience as a certified ship officer, holding or having held a valid STCW II/2
or III/2 certificate of competency not limited in terms of the operating area or
propulsion power or tonnage (with amaritime experience of at least 5 years, including
periods served at sea as officers in the deck- or engine-department respectively, or as a
flag State inspector or as an assistant Port State Control inspector. Such experience
shall include a period of at least 2 years at sea as a deck or engine officer) or
(b) Passed an examination recognised by the competent Authority as a naval
(c) Architect, mechanical engineer or an engineer related to the maritime fields and
worked in that capacity for at least 5 years or
(d) A relevant university degree or equivalent and have properly trained and qualified
as ship safety inspectors
In addition, inspectors must have the following:
– Completed a minimum of 1 year service as a flag-State inspector either dealing
with surveys and certification in accordance with the Conventions or involved in
the monitoring of the activities of recognised organisations to which statutory tasks
have been delegated or
– Gained an equivalent level of competence by following a minimum of 1 year field
training participating in Port State Control inspections under the guidance of
experienced Port State Control officers
2.2 The legal basis of PSC inspections within the framework of the European
Union
The legal basis is the European Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State Control replaced
Directive 95/21/EC and established a new system, which was transposed into Spanish
law by Royal Decree 1737/2010 (EU 2009).
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One of the aims of the new regulations was to achieve equal EU member state
participation in the envisaged comprehensive inspection system by sharing the volume
of inspections evenly among member states. Another crucial goal was to standardise ship
detention criteria and inspection regulations and procedures in order to achieve uniform
application in all ports and thus prevent ships from choosing particular ports in order to
elude more rigorous control by the marine authorities. The directive also toughened the
criteria for refusing community port access to ships that present a clear hazard to maritime
safety and the marine environment. Such refusal can now become permanent if the ship
operator persistently fails to take corrective actions following several refusals of access.
The inspection commitments for each member state are determined by calculating
the average number of inspections in the last 3 years. The resulting figure is taken to
represent the total number of ships to inspect by all MoU signatories, and this number is
then distributed among the member states in proportion to the calls made in each
country in the last 3 years (Table 1).
Pursuant to article 22 of Directive 2009/16/EC, amended by Directive 2013/38/EU,
inspections can only be carried out by inspectors who fulfil the qualification criteria
specified in Annex XI and who are authorised to carry out PSC by the competent
authority, although they may be assisted by any person with the required expertise. In
addition, all inspectors must carry a personal document in the form of an identity card
issued by their competent authority.
The article further stipulates that inspectors must neither have any commercial
interest in the port of inspection or in the ships inspected nor can they be employed
by, or undertake work on behalf of, non-governmental organisations which issue
statutory and classification certificates or which carry out the surveys necessary for
the issue of those certificates to ships.
The same article also establishes that EU member states shall ensure that the
competence of inspectors and their compliance with the minimum criteria referred to
in Annex XI are verified and that the inspectors have received appropriate training in
relation to changes to the PSC system applied in the community as laid down in this
directive and amendments to the conventions. To this end, an EU Commission shall
develop and promote a harmonised community scheme for the training and assessment
of competences of PSC inspectors by member states.
3 The case study of the Spanish Maritime Administration
3.1 Inspectors and inspections in the Spanish Maritime Administration
The national port system in Spain comprises 44 ports of strategic importance that
handle a high annual volume of traffic. Although there are other ports in Spain, these do
not cater for international traffic and therefore do not carry out PSC inspections.
There are four professional profiles in Spain that comply with Annex XI of the
Directive: naval architect, captain of the merchant navy, chief engineer and radio
officer. These can be professional qualifications, in accordance with the STCWAgree-
ment, or university degrees that have entailed the appropriate training. There is no
specific degree in Spain in maritime inspection, although this is contemplated in the
directive and may exist in other countries.
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Spain has 92 PSC inspectors based at 29 harbour masters’ offices from where they
can inspect other terminals or ports where foreign ships dock to carry out operations.
Table 2 shows the number of accredited inspectors at each harbour master’s office,
which have been grouped according to area (north, south, Mediterranean and the
Canary Islands).
As can be seen in these two tables, there is neither direct relationship between
the distribution of inspectors and port importance nor volume of traffic; rather,
with the exception of the occasional port, their distribution is relatively uneven.
Neither is there a logical distribution in relation to the demand for inspections;
there are almost twice as many inspectors in the north as in the south or the
Mediterranean. However, it is in these latter areas where the ports with the most
traffic are located, such as Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona. Not only are there
Table 1 Inspections: commitment and performance
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Source: authors’ own elaboration from Paris MoU database
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more PSC officers in the north, but there is often also a higher number of maritime
inspectors in general, including Flag State inspectors. The more inspectors there
are attached to a given harbour master’s office, the greater the possibilities for
specialisation in any of the areas established by the Paris MoU, thus increasing the
number of trained inspectors meeting the accreditation criteria.
In accordance with the NIR established in 2011, Spain has 92 PSC officers
qualified to carry out MoU inspections. However, these are distributed unevenly
around the country. It is therefore not surprising to find that an analysis of the
number of inspections they had carried out revealed that only 36 of them had
carried out more than 30 inspections (approximately 3 inspections per month).
Table 3 shows inspectors ranked according to the number of inspections they
have conducted in the past year: one inspector had even carried out over 100
inspections. Table 4 shows only the most experienced inspectors (>30 per year),
divided according to their qualifications. As can be seen, there is a clear
predominance of captains and naval architects over chief engineers and radio
officers.
According to Spanish Maritime Administration training requirements, inspectors
must have the following:
– Carried out a minimum of between 15 and 25 inspections under the supervision of
an accredited inspector
– Completed European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) online training courses on
technical aspects, procedures and conduct in different situations, aimed at
standardising inspection and criteria
– Completed the two Spanish Directorate General of the Merchant Navy (DGMM)
training courses on basic aspects of MoU inspection, MoU documents and an-
nexes, and relevant European and Spanish legislation
– Completed the week-long ‘New Entrant Seminar’ course delivered at
EMSA headquarters in Lisbon. This is aimed at new inspectors from all
member states and consists of workshops on correct procedure in real
scenarios and cases
Once inspectors have successfully completed this stage, an identity card is issued,
duly translated into English, containing the following information:
1. Declaration that the identity card has been issued by the DGMM
2. Name, surname and recent photograph of the holder
3. Unique, non-transferable identifier
4. Signature of the identity card holder
5. Declaration authorising the holder to carry out ship inspections on behalf of Port
State Control
Accreditation is valid for 5 years and renewal is based on participation in a
professional development scheme in which credits are awarded for successfully com-
pleted activities. This ensures that accreditation is limited solely to inspectors who carry
out regular inspections and are up-to-date with modifications to MoU procedures and
documents.
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To renew their accreditation, inspectors must earn a minimum of 30 credits
within 5 years. The professional development scheme includes a series of
compulsory activities, which must be carried out by all MoU inspectors who
wish to renew their accreditation, and optional activities that can be selected to
obtain the necessary additional credits. Table 5 shows the activities and their
credits.
Table 2 Number of Port State
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Source: authors’ own elaboration
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3.2 Deficiencies and detentions based on inspector’s background
3.2.1 The survey: methodology and participants
Given the preliminary study of Knapp and Franses (2007b), we focused our study, not
only by inspectors but by groups of more than one inspector. Of the 92 accredited PSC
inspectors in Spain, we selected 36 who had carried out a significant number of
inspections (>30 per year) in the year 2011. Data about the inspector’s background
were collected directly from each between 29 harbour masters’ offices. We divided
Spain into the four previously mentioned areas, and from each area we selected
different inspector profiles. The number of 36 PSC officers was reduced to 15 because
we did not take into account periodic inspections of ferries that regularly sail from
Spain. Thus, we selected all inspections performed over 1 year by 15 inspectors with
different professional profiles. The contact was made first by phone and then the data
were used by the database THETIS. The sample finally included 387 inspections,
accounting for 21.5 % of all those carried out that year. Table 6 shows the general
profile of these inspections by deficiencies detected.
We looked at all possible combinations of the four professional profiles, bearing in
mind that inspections may be carried out individually or by a team, and established a
coding system, as shown in Fig. 1. For example, code 2101 represents a team
inspection carried out by 2 captains, 1 chief engineer and 1 radio officer, but without
Table 3 Ranking of PSCOs
Ranking Profile Harbour master’s office Number of PSCO
1 Captain Algeciras 102
2 Naval architecture Algeciras 82
3 Captain Castellón 81
4 Naval architecture Las Palmas 68
5 Captain Bilbao 68
6 Naval architecture Las Palmas 67
7 Captain Valencia 67
8 Captain Huelva 63
‘Captain’ profile includes all nautical degrees. Source: authors’ own elaboration
PSCO Port State Control officer
Table 4 Number of PSCOs with
more than 30 inspections





‘Captain’ profile includes all nautical degrees. Source: authors’ own
elaboration
PSCO Port State Control officer
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a naval architect. With a view to further this issue and gain a clearer understanding on
how inspector’s background influences in the type or number of deficiencies of the
vessels, what follows is a detailed examination of the replies received to our research.
3.2.2 Results and findings
In the first year after entry into force of the NIR, 1794 inspections were carried out in
Spain. This was the highest number of inspections carried out by a single member state
and accounted for 9.41 % of the total number of inspections conducted throughout the
entire MoU region. Italy followed closely behind with 9 %, and Holland and the UK
with 8.42 %. An analysis of the statistics for the entire MoU area revealed that the
percentage of inspections in which deficiencies were detected was distinctly higher than
average in Spain, and the percentage of detentions was markedly higher, being almost
double the average. This finding is open to several interpretations. One explanation
might be that Spanish inspectors are more rigorous, perhaps because training and





10 per year 5
25 per year 10
40 per year 20
Training module of procedures 5
Optional activities
Courses/workshops
EMSA refreshing course 10
MoU procedures workshop 5
MoU expert course 5
National refreshing course 5
National workshop 5
Training module of procedures 5
Source: authors’ own elaboration
PSCOs Port State Control officers
Table 6 General profile of the
inspections by deficiencies
(sample of 387 inspections)
Number of inspections Percentage
0 Deficiency 123 32
1 Deficiency 35 9
2 Deficiencies 64 17
3 Deficiencies 36 10
4 Deficiencies 28 7
5 Or more deficiencies 97 25
Source: authors’ own elaboration
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specialisation is better in Spain than in other member countries. Another explanation
could be that due to Spain’s strategic position, among other factors, the ships calling in
Spanish ports may present more deficiencies in terms of their condition, crew or
equipment. Spain ranks highest for total number of detentions, with 122 ships detained
in the year under study.
No deficiencies were found in 123 of the 387 inspections analysed. The data showed
that most inspections where no deficiencies were detected (85 %) had been carried out
by only one inspector, irrespective of profile, indicating that the number of deficiencies
detected is lower when inspections are carried out by a sole inspector.
To determine possible differences by professional profile, we analysed the results of
the four combinations (1000, 0100, 0010 and 0001) that represent inspections per-
formed by a single inspector, irrespective of profile. Next, we limited our analysis to
inspections that corresponded to one of these combinations, namely, inspections carried
out by just one inspector. The results are shown in Fig. 2.
We also analysed the most prevalent or common types of deficiency by each of these
four profiles. The deficiencies were grouped and the results are shown in Fig. 3.
As can be seen, when chief engineers carried out inspections alone, they detected a
high number of deficiencies related to propulsion. Naval architects detected a similar
but slightly lower proportion of deficiencies in this area, but the percentage detected by
captains was much lower. Captains detected a higher number of deficiencies than other
profiles in aspects that are more closely related to a nautical qualification, such as life-
saving appliances, ship safety, and living and working conditions aboard.
With modern advances in electronic technology, satellite communication and com-
puters, the radio officers are going into extinction. Radio inspectors do not have sea-
going experience. However, nautical schools still train radio officers and they can
become PSC officers according to the mentioned Annex XI of the Directive 2009/16/
EU, amended by Directive 2013/38/EU. Nonetheless, it is also interesting to note that
although radio officers have most expertise in radio communication deficiencies, there
was no significant difference in the percentage of deficiencies they detected compared
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Fig. 1 Different possible combinations of the inspections
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No. def. 













































































Fig. 2 Number of deficiencies vs professional profiles




































































































































Fig. 3 Types of deficiencies for
each of those four profiles
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with the highest rate of detentions in the 387 inspections sampled, bearing in mind that
the total number of detentions in this sample was 27. As can be seen in Fig. 4, by far the
most detentions were made by profile 0110 (naval architect and chief engineer
conducting an inspection together), followed in second place by the profile of chief
engineer when inspecting alone. These data clearly show that ships are much more
likely to be detained when a chief engineer forms part of the inspection team.
We also analysed the type of ship most frequently detained in the sample studied and
found that this corresponded to general cargo ships, which accounted for 21 out of 27
detentions. This trend coincides with that of the MoU region as a whole, where general
cargo ships are also the most frequently detained type of vessel. An analysis of our
sample also revealed differences between harbour master’s offices regarding applica-
tion of PSC criteria. Whereas some considered certain deficiencies to justify detention,
the majority did not. One of the objectives of the initial entry and professional
development courses for PSC officers is to standardise criteria in given situations,
and these have even been codified. Furthermore, the work of the Directorate General of
the Merchant Navy is also aimed towards standardisation. Nevertheless, some harbour
master’s offices detect a higher than average number of deficiencies per inspection and
appear to be more stringent when assessing possible defects in a ship or its crew that
could be considered as deficiencies.
In relation to the previous study of Knapp and Franses (2007b), we perceive some
differences and some similarities: our study is quantitatively smaller but it covers





























Fig. 4 Team and rate of
detentions
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focused on a single maritime administration, so that the data can be more
homogeneous. Nevertheless, the main qualitative findings of Knapp and Franses
(2007b) coincide with our national survey: the probability of detention of inspectors
with an engineering background seems to be slightly higher compared with a nautical
background.
4 Conclusions
Spain is responsible for a relatively high percentage of the deficiencies detected and
detentions imposed in the European Union and consequently in the Paris MoU region.
Further national studies are required to validate the conclusions of the present study;
however, unlike general data on detained ships by country or deficiency code, national
data are unfortunately not publicly available. We can conclude that there are differences
but, as other authors’ research stated, more analysis are required for other maritime
administrations.
Nevertheless, our case study revealed that there was neither direct relationship
between the number of inspectors allocated to ports and port traffic or importance
nor were inspectors distributed evenly by professional profile. Neither European
Directive 2009/16 nor the MoU guidelines on inspections make a distinction between
types of professional profile nor establish the number of inspectors that should form an
inspection team. In practice, however, all inspectors will be better equipped to evaluate
some types of deficiency more than others according to their individual academic
training and experience on ships. The data reported here clearly evidence the need
for multidisciplinary teams, something that is contemplated in the MoU guidelines but
is not mandatory. Teams are more likely to detect deficiencies on ships and also allow
for joint decision-making, which is especially useful in the case of problematic or sub-
standard ships. Our argument is clearly supported by the correlation we found between
deficiencies detected and professional profile.
Our conclusions highlight the limitations of the NIR, given that variations in
inspection stringency and results determine the interval between a ship’s inspections.
Thus, if an inspection team fails to apply inspection criteria appropriately, conducting a
less than rigorous inspection in which few deficiencies are detected, a ship in poor
condition may receive a favourable result. In consequence, not only the ship but also
the ship-owning company, the flag State and the classification society will be granted a
longer interval between inspections.
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